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FIRST CAMPAIGN

IN THE

HILLS NORTH OF CUTCHEE.

YB 28308

H. Morse Stephens.

University of California

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MEMOIR

OF

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN

IN THE

HILLS NORTH OF CUTCHEE,

UNDER MAJOR BILLAMORE, IN 1839—40.

By One of his Surviving Subalterns.

Major, afterwards Brig-Gen.
John Jacob C.

LONDON:

WM. H. ALLEN, AND CO.,

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1852.

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MEMOIR

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THE FIRST CAMPAIGN

IN THE

HILLS NORTH OF CUTCHEE.

The author of the history of Sir Charles Napier's administration in Sinde, including the hill "campaign," not contented with such exaggerated praises of his hero and of his exploits as make his book no more resemble sober and true history than do Gulliver's travels, has thought proper to assert that no troops had ever before entered those hills without disaster. The following account of the *first* hill campaign in Cutchee, in 1839-40, is given to the public, and will perhaps a little enlighten the historian of Sinde.

In the year 1839, after Lord Keane and his army had passed through Cutchee *en route* to Afghanistan, the predatory tribes inhabiting the eastern part of that province, namely, the Doombkees and Jekranees, with others of less note asso-

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ciated with them, infested the road from the neighbourhood of Shikarpoor to the mouth of the Bolaun in such numbers, and with such boldness, that a whole regiment was required to escort a convoy in safety from Shikarpoor to Dadur. The matter was of serious importance, for the safety of the army in Afghanistan might depend on the supplies forwarded to it from Sinde; while the number of troops in Upper Sinde was totally inadequate to the furnishing, for a continuance, the strong escorts required. The heat also in this part of the world, from April to October, is more deadly than the sword of a human enemy, and scarcely an escort at this time marched through the country without losing many men from this cause alone.

Mr. Bell, the political agent, in vain made every effort to obtain a free passage through Cutchee by negotiation and pecuniary arrangements with the plundering tribes; their chiefs were deaf to all persuasion, and scorned every offer.

It may be well to observe here, as the matter has been greatly mystified by the historian of Sir Charles Napier's conquest of Sinde and hill campaign, that the Doombkees and Jekranees are not hill tribes; they resided wholly in the plain of Cutchee, and possessed the towns of Lahree,

Poolijee, and Chuttur, with some villages in that neighbourhood and the adjoining lands. Their fighting men were all mounted; they were, indeed, tribes of horsemen. The Murrees and Boogtees inhabited the neighbouring hills; the chief town of the former, Kahun, of the latter, Deyra. These mountain tribes were nearly all footmen, and seldom or never ventured in hostile guise into the plain country. While the Doombkees and Jekranees were in power, the horsemen were far too strong for them in the plain, while, on the other hand, they were safe in their mountain fastnesses from the attacks of the lowlanders. Such being the respective positions, these warlike tribes, with occasional exceptions, were usually on friendly terms, and afforded each other mutual support.

The head of the whole Doombkee tribe by birth was, and is still, Belooche Khan, of Lahree, but he being of a quiet, peaceable disposition, preferred a life of ease at home to one of stormy adventure and predatory warfare; he never joined in any plundering excursion, and quarrelled with nobody, but lived like a quiet country gentleman in the midst of his turbulent brethren. He was on this account held in contempt by the warlike part of his tribe; and Beejar Khan, in power, in-

fluence, and all else but name, had, long before we entered the country, made himself the real head, not only of the Doombkees, but also of the associated tribe of Jekranees. Beejar Khan was a man of considerable ability; he not only kept his wild riders completely under his authority, but was far-famed for his justice and excellent civil arrangements. His ryots, from being oppressed, were protected and made much of; his lands were well cultivated, and the traders, as well as the peasantry of the whole country, were safe and contented under his rule. He paid his revenue regularly to his feudal lord, the khan of Kital, who therefore seldom troubled himself with regard to his other proceedings. All this internal good management enabled the Doombkee leader to carry on his predatory excursions systematically, and on an extensive scale, against any of his neighbours offering a fair prospect of a valuable booty. Beejar had at this time under his control from one thousand to one thousand five hundred horse, the best and boldest in the country; and incited by his prince, Mehrab Khan, as well as by inclination and habit, he now directed all his efforts against the valuable British convoys, &c., passing within his reach through Cutchee. This was the state of the people. It may be well also

to describe their principal towns; Lahree, the abode of Belooche Khan, is, or rather was at that time, for it has since been ruined by Murree plunderers, a considerable town, well supplied with shops, containing about two thousand inhabitants, and surrounded by a good sound mud wall about twenty feet high, and well flanked with round towers. From the character of the chief, Belooche Khan, already described, his town had no connection with the predatory riders of Cutchee.

The chief town possessed by Beejar Khan and his part of the Doombkee tribe, was Poolijee. This place consisted of two villages, about three-quarters of a mile apart; that one towards the north was a small place, about seven hundred yards in circumference; it had been originally surrounded by a good high mud wall with towers, but these had been allowed to decay; some of the towers and large portions of the wall had fallen down; manure and heaps of rubbish had accumulated in and outside these openings, and this place could not be considered as at all defensible against a resolute enemy. The other village was much larger, being a mile and a-half in circumference; it is surrounded by a mud wall about seven feet high, and for about two feet from the top, not

more than four inches thick; on the south side, where is the principal entrance, the wall is flanked by round towers; but by far the greater part of the whole circumference of the place is unprovided with any flanking defence. The wall is, and was when first seen by the British, in a wretchedly crazy state; in it were numerous holes and wide cracks, which had been filled up with a few thorns to prevent the egress of the cattle of the village. A man, standing at the foot of the wall, and laying hold of the top, which was within easy reach, with his hands, could with ease, pull down many square feet of the wall at once; and this has several times been done by way of experiment by the writer of this paper.

Within this enclosure, not far from its north-eastern side, was another small square mud building, with round towers at the angles; this was also completely decayed, but was still capable of some defence by determined men. It could not, however, have held out after the town had been taken. The place is supplied with water from five temporary wells outside the town, on the south side, about one hundred yards distant from the wall. Durrya Khan, the Jekranee chief associated with Beejar and the Doombkees, occupied the town of Chuttur, nine miles south of Poolijee;

this is an older, and was a more important place, as regarded its peaceable inhabitants, and it contained a good bazaar. It is about the same size as the principal Poolijee, and surrounded by a wall a little higher than, but of a similar description and in a similar state, to that above described. The village of Shahpoor, belonging to a syud, by name Enayut Shah, a peer or saint by birth, but by birth only, for his private character was and is anything but saintly; this place was protected chiefly by the holy character of the peer; it was occasionally occupied by the Doombkees and Jekranees, but none of them permanently resided there. In size it was about a mile in circumference; it is not surrounded by a wall for defence, but the houses touching each other nearly all round, leave only two regular entrances. The houses generally are the usual low mud huts of the country, but there are two fine large upper-storied and terrace-roofed houses adjoining the north side of the village, and a high square tower towards the eastern side.

From the roofs of these houses the whole place was overlooked and commanded, and they were well adapted for defence.

The permanent inhabitants of Shahpoor amounted to about one thousand. But there were gene-

rally nearly double that number of Jutts encamped in their mat tents close to the village. These were the attendants of the syud's camels, of which he possessed some ten thousand. The channel of an occasional mountain torrent runs near the south-side of Shahpoor, and an abundant supply of good water is found by digging pits in its beds. This good supply of water, which is a very rare thing in Eastern Cutchee, is the sole advantage which this spot presents as a site for a town; the immediate neigbourhood is a dreary waste of barren plain, and hills of drift sand; at a distance, however, of four or five miles from Shahpoor, abundant forage exists for horses as well as camels. The place is remarkable for its dust storms which, bad everywhere, in Upper Sinde and Cutchee, are here of almost incredible violence and density.

They occur frequently at all seasons of the year, sometimes changing the light of mid-day to an intensity of darkness, to which no ordinary night ever approaches, and this darkness in severe storms lasts occasionally for one, two, or more hours. These dust storms on both sides of the desert, are sometimes accompanied by blasts of the simoom, a poisonous wind, which is equally destructive to vegetable and animal life.

Such was the state of the people and of the country, when, at the request of the political officers, a detachment was ordered in the month of June, 1839, to proceed from Sukkur and Shikarpoor against Beejar Khan. The season was one of intense heat, which has never since been equalled; the thermometer in the hospital shed, at Shikarpoor, stood commonly at 130°, and on several days reached the astonishing height of 140°, one day it even stood at 143°. The wind appeared like a blast from a furnace, and this even at midnight. Such was the weather in which British soldiers were sent forth for the first time, to proceed against the wild tribes of Eastern Beloochistan.

There had been left behind, from the army of Lord Keane at Sukkur, about one hundred and fifty European soldiers, men chosen from every regiment of the army, royal and Company's, and from every troop of horse and company of foot artillery, of both the Bengal and Bombay Presidencies.

These men were of course the worst which could be found; they were composed of those who could not march, who were troublesome, disorderly, discontented, or feeble. These men were placed under the command of Lieutenant Jacob, the

only artillery officer in Upper Sinde, and of Lieutenant Corry, of her Majesty's 17th regiment. Lieutenant Jacob was now directed to choose men from these Europeans to form a company of artillery, to proceed with the force to Cutchee. Accordingly he selected twenty artillery men, the best he could find, and twenty men belonging to the infantry, and with Lieutenant Corry and these forty men, marched from Sukkur on the 3rd June, 1839, *en route* to Shikarpoor, having sent his battery in advance by water to that place.

On the first day's march of ten miles, seven of the soldiers were struck dead by the heat, and Lieutenant Corry was brought in dying; the poor fellow rallied a little at night, but as the heat returned next day he also relapsed and died. Four other men were sent back to Sukkur on camel litters, but they also died, either on the road or immediately after reaching the hospital. No treatment appeared to have the smallest effect in checking this fearful mortality. The men became appalled and wished not to proceed; but a few words from their officer roused their English hearts to further exertion; at night the detachment marched on, but though the men were never directly exposed to the sun, the heat was too great for human nature to bear, and four men died before, or on

reaching Shikarpoor. Thus, in three very short marches, out of a detachment of two officers and forty men, one officer and fifteen men had been struck dead. It appeared to the military authorities, that it was impossible at such a season to prosecute the intended expedition, and the attempt was abandoned for the present to be renewed when the deadly heat should be moderated.

According, early in the month of October, 1839, a force consisting of a wing of the 1st grenadier regiment of Bombay Native Infantry, about four hundred and fifty strong, the light company of the 5th regiment of Bombay Native Infantry, about eighty strong, and a bullock battery, composed of two twenty-four pounder howitzers, and one six pounder gun marched from Sukkur *en route* to Poolijee, for the purpose of operating against Beejar Khan, and the predatory tribes of Cutchee described above.

It was thought unadvisable to have any European soldiers with the force; and Lieutenant Jacob was ordered to form a native company of artillery as he could. He had a havildar and eleven golandauze sepoys, and a few gun lascars, to commence with; and he was allowed to select a party of men from the Bombay 23rd regiment, to complete the number required.

A company of pioneers was also formed, consisting of one regular sapper, and three regular pioneers, the remainder of store and tent lascars, to the number of fifty in all. These companies, notwithstanding their motley appearance, were soon sufficiently trained and organized for service, and proved afterwards eminently efficient, with the exception of the men of the 23rd regiment. This regiment, it appeared, had the fashion of priding itself on the *caste* of its members, instead of on their soldiership—more like a regiment of the Bengal army than one of Bombay; and, notwithstanding the ridicule of the havildar and sepoys of the golandauze, who happened to be all Brahmans, but who thoroughly despised such nonsense, gave so much trouble, and proved so very useless in consequence, that the artillery officer soon left them behind, and they were replaced by a native officer and men of the Bombay 5th regiment of native infantry. This regiment was at this time one of the best, perhaps *the* best, in the Bombay army—its men were perfect specimens of the Bombay sepoys, as described by Sir John Malcolm. "The true descendants of Seewajies mountain rats, whom not all the pride and power of the armies of Hindustan could prevent from marching to the gates of Delhie," small, and not at all good

looking, but of an amazing energy and activity, and full of zeal and courage, with sinews that no labour could tire, and hearts that no danger could daunt, very respectful, and warmly attached to their officers,—they not only feared no enemy under their guidance, but rejoiced at the prospect of meeting a formidable foe for the sake of the regiment. They were full of soldier-like pride and zeal for the service, while they shrunk from no sort of labour or fatigue, and endured cold, hunger, and continual duty with an admirable cheerfulness and alacrity.

Major Billamore, of the 1st Bombay grenadier regiment, commanded the whole force; Captain Raitt the grenadier regiment; Captain Lewis Brown, afterwards well known as "Kalum Brown," the light company of the 5th; and Lieutenant Jacob the artillery.

This little force crossed the desert, and marched to Shahpoor without incident worth relating; thence it proceeded to Chuttur and Poolijee; the former place was then occupied by Lieutenant Amiel, with four hundred Belooche horsemen, lately enlisted into the British service by the political agent, Mr. Bell. On the arrival of Major Billamore at Shahpoor, Beejar Khan, with the chief part of the Doombkee and Jekranee tribes, still

occupied Poolijee; but on the force reaching that place, it was found deserted, nearly destroyed by fire, and still burning. Beejar Khan and all his people had abandoned the town, and taken to the hills for safety.

The force now encamped at Poolijee, until the political officers, from whom the commanding officer had to receive his instructions, should make up their minds as to what further was to be done. The part of the Dombkee tribe, under the chief, Belooche Khan, inhabiting Lahree and its neighbourhood, had once offered complete submission to the British political officers: this was accepted; nor could the utmost efforts of Beejar, nor persuasion nor reproach, ever afterwards induce him, Belooche Khan, to commit himself in hostility against the English.

While the force remained encamped at Poolijee, Beejar having in vain summoned aid from Belooche Khan, suddenly left the hills with his own followers, and entered the plain near Poolijee, as if to attack Major Billamore. The major had at that time no cavalry with him; but on this particular day, Lieutenant Amiel, who was not in any way under Major Billamore's orders, had arrived at Poolijee with two hundred of his Belooche levy of horse, and occupied the town.

The town of Poolijee is distant from the hills little more than five miles. About three miles of this distance, next the hills, is open stony ground; there is then thick jungle for about one mile, and the remaining space next Poolijee is richly cultivated arable land, which was at this time covered with high standing corn. Having received information of the enemy having left the hills, Major Billamore moved from his camp for the purpose of meeting him in the plain. Meanwhile the intelligence had also reached the officer in command of the Belooche horse in the town, who immediately galloped out with his men, passed by Major Billamore's force, then moving through the jungle, and entered the plain beyond. Here the horsemen fell in with the enemy, and immediately turned and fled at speed; some twenty-five of them were cut down, the enemy not losing a man, the remainder escaped owing to the fleetness of their mares. So quickly did all this take place, that Major Billamore, on clearing the jungle, had only a distant view of the enemy filing over the first low range of hills. Without cavalry, pursuit was hopeless—to attempt it, absurd; and the major returned to his camp, Lieutenant Amiel and his cavaliers again returning to Chuttur, and shortly afterwards to Shahpoor, where they thenceforth remained.

On the representation of Major Billamore, as to the necessity of his having cavalry at his disposal, to enable him to act effectively against these border robbers, a detachment of one hundred and eighty irregular horse, under command of Lieutenant Clarke, of the 2nd Bombay grenadier regiment, was ordered to join the force at Poolijee. This detachment, formerly posted in Cutch (Bhoos) had just before been transferred from the Poona irregular horse, in order to form the nucleus of the new corps, at that time ordered to be raised in Sinde, since well known by the name of the Sinde irregular horse.

On the arrival of Lieutenant Clarke and his detachment at Chuttur, he received information of a strong party of Beejar Khan's horsemen having left the hills that evening to plunder. Acting at once on this information, and guided by a man of the village, who had been plundered shortly before, Lieutenant Clarke went out about midnight with one-half of his men, and managed matters so well, that just before day-break he fell in with the Doombkees, about 300 in number, dismounted in a corn field; they had just time to spring on their mares before Clarke closed with them, and, in doing so, abandoned some of their arms, and nearly all the plunder. They fled up the dry bed of the Tey-

waugh river, and were vigorously pursued by the Sinde irregular horse. About fifty of the marauders were killed, and eleven taken prisoners.

To appreciate this exploit as it deserves, and properly to understand the position of Major Billamore's force, it should be borne in mind, that the country, its people, and all belonging to it, were at this time entirely unknown to the officers and men of the Indian army. Everything was as different as can well be imagined from anything any one had experienced in India. Since then all has become as familar to them as the localities of Guzzerat, or of the Deccan; but at that time all of them, officers and men, were "griffins" in this country, and had to find out everything for themselves. No information was to be acquired from any one; no European had previously entered that part of the country, while the few natives who could have assisted the British officers were more afraid of the border robbers than inclined to trust to British protection. Lieutenant Amiel, who had lately been joined at Shahpoor by two hundred and fifty of skinners, Hindustanee irregular horse, now reported to Major Billamore that a strong body of the Dombkees and Jekranees had for some time past been assembled at Ooch, and that they came nearly every night to plunder about Shah-

poor. On this, Major Billamore, with thirty infantry and sixty of the Sinde irregular horse, accompanied by Captain Brown, Lieutenants Clarke and Jacob, proceeded to Ooch.

As this Ooch is one of the most curious places in existence, it may be as well to describe it. The place is not only curious in itself, but very interesting, as affording proof positive of the correctness of the description given by "the Father of History," of places on the caravan roads in Africa, where fresh water runs out of hills of salt. East of Shahpoor is a low and very irregular range of hills, composed of soft sand stone, in masses, more like hard earth than rock, and mingled with pebbles of lime stone and flint, and with a good deal of gypsum. At a spot twelve miles E.S.E. from Shahpoor, there is in these hills the entrance to a little valley some five or six hundred yards wide. Through this runs the bed of an occasional mountain torrent, known by the name of the Muzzerdaun; and along the northern side of this torrent bed, for an extent of a mile and a half in length, some twenty-five or thirty feet in height, is a rounded bank, partly covered with coarse reeds, and where it is not so entirely covered with a thick *incrustation of efflorescent salt*. On the top of the bank grow a few date trees, which trees are found no where else

in Cutchee. From this bank, nearly all over it, *from* TOP to bottom, continually exudes water, which, though not exactly sweet to a fastidious taste, is highly esteemed by a thirsty traveller, and is largely drank by man and beast without any ill effects, except to strangers. The natives, who are accustomed to its use, appear not to think it bad or disagreeable, and call it fresh. This water, trickling down the bank of salt, collects into a small stream, which, at a distance of about a mile from the hill, southward, is lost in the desert.

The only permanent inhabitant of this spot is a solitary fukkeer and even he is not always at home, there is no building whatever, nor remains of a building save the fukkeer's hut of reed sticks and mud. The place is, however, in tolerably quiet times, the favorite resort of large numbers of Jutts, who with camels and other cattle to the amount of many thousands sometimes encamp there for several months together.

The country all around is of the most desolate appearance, perfectly bare and barren hill and plain, varied by drift sand, being alone visible anywhere, and this makes the green and moist spot Ooch, the more remarkable. This place Major Billamore and party had to discover for themselves; no one could be found to guide them;

the general direction alone was pointed out and the distance given.

As the Major approached Ooch, single horsemen were seen galloping from all quarters towards one spot, and towards this also rode the British officers and horsemen; they soon found themselves in the middle of the Belooche encampment. The enemy's horsemen, in number about one hundred, had time to spring on their mares, which are always kept ready saddled, and well knowing the country, which is of a nature most difficult to a stranger, easily effected their escape unhurt. The footmen, in about equal number, with some women and children, while the cavalry had in vain attempted to close with their fleet-footed foes, climbed to the top of the hills, whence having secured the women and children in caves, they opened a smart matchlock fire. The infantry detachment was of course far behind, but Clarke soon dismounted some of his men, when Major Billamore with them and his European officers immediately attacked the enemy on the hill. In entire ignorance, as they at that time were, of our usages, the barbarians refused to surrender till about twenty of their men were killed and several others wounded, when seeing resistance hopeless and the women in our pos-

session, the remainder surrendered, and were forwarded to Shahpoor with the cattle, &c., taken from the enemy. Major Billamore had received information from these prisoners that the leaders of the party he had surprised at Ooch were Janee and Rahmut, the two most enterprising and most famous of the Belooche warriors.

In the hope of again meeting with these noted freebooters, and thinking it possible from their well-known boldness and personal courage, that they might even attack him, Major Billamore determined to remain for the night at Ooch; and, sending back the infantry to Shahpoor, to endeavour in the morning to follow up the enemy with his cavalry. This was carried into effect, but after wandering next day many miles in vain, over an unknown and pathless waste, the attempt to reach such active enemies was unwillingly abandoned, and the troop returned to Ooch. Scarcely, however, had the horses of the party time to drink, when, as if by magic suddenly appeared not half a mile off, opposite to an opening in the hills, Janee, Rahmut, and a hundred Belooche mounted and drawn up in regular line, as if to charge the British detachment. With the speed of thought the men of the latter were in their saddles, the next instant they were formed and riding at the

enemy so fairly opposed them. Janee and his men drew their swords and advanced with a shout, and valiant deeds appeared about to take place; the ground looked firm and level for a fair passage of arms, when suddenly every horse of the British detachment sunk into the earth, some planted over girth and saddle flap, many rolled over and over, and all in helpless confusion. The cunning Belooche had drawn them into an extensive quicksand! One European officer of the whole party being admirably mounted, alone struggled on through it; but Janee carelessly or generously took no notice of him, as he still rode towards him, but with shouts of laughter the Belooche riders went off at speed, and disappeared from, almost as suddenly as they appeared on, the scene. Major Billamore and party unable to catch their active and subtle foes returned to Shahpoor, and thence to Poolijee, where at last, final instructions were received from the political officers, and in the beginning of the month of November, 1839, the force proceeded in two detachments to enter the Murree and Boogtee hills, wherein the Dombkees and Jekranees had found refuge.

One party proceeded, *via* the Goree pass near Poolijee towards Deyra, and the other *via* Lahree, and the pass near that town towards Kahun.

The first party consisted of Major Billamore and Captain Brown, who acted as staff officers to the force. The light company of the 5th regiment, under Lieutenant Stanley, a company of the grenadiers, the artillery under Lieutenant Jacob, and one hundred and twenty men of the Sinde irregular horse under Lieutenant Clarke. The detachment proceeding to Kahun was commanded by Captain Raitt, and consisted of the main body of the grenadier regiment, and sixty of Clarke's horsemen.

Nothing whatever was procurable, it was said, in the hills, but water, wood, and a little grass; so that even for so small a force to be in an efficient state, extensive commissariat arrangements were required. With little or no assistance from either the military or civil authorities at head quarters, and without public treasure, these arrangements were admirably made by the officers of the force. There was little experience indeed, for all were on their first campaign, but the officers were full of unconquerable zeal, of an energy which nothing could tire, and thrilling with those chivalrous thoughts of military service, to which the youthful soldier, alas! is alone allowed to give place in his mind, but which cause fatigue, hardship, danger, difficulty and impossibility itself, to disappear

before them. The greatest point was to provide food for the artillery bullocks, of which one hundred and twenty necessarily accompanied the force. The mention of bullocks may raise a smile on the face of the modern artillery-man. In these days a bullock battery is unknown, its place has been taken by the well-appointed and well-horsed battery now in use, equipped and provided in every possible way, fully manned and officered, &c., &c.

The modern horse battery is beautiful, soldier-like and complete; nevertheless, when I hear sometimes its *immeasurable* superiority over "the old beef affair" talked of, I cannot help silently thinking of Major Billamore's artillery in the Murree hills, and of the subsequent performances of the Bengal horse artillery, and of Bombay horse batteries in the same locality; and a thought then crosses the mind that the *material* is not all in all in these things! Let, then, those laugh who may. The bullocks were the object of great care and attention; it was managed not only to carry a full allowance of grain for a month, but a supply of forage enough for a week's consumption was also taken; all this care was well repaid in the sequel.

There was no baggage corps nor camel corps, but there was common sense; nothing was for-

gotten that foresight could provide for, or means at command procure. Thus provided, the two detachments entered the hills, and both reached the respective halting-places, Deyra and Kahun, by regular marches; not without much labour certainly, owing to the awfully difficult nature of the country, which even the romantic historian of Sinde has not been able much to exaggerate, although his hero *had no experience of the more difficult parts of these mountains, not having entered the Murree hills, and never having seen "Surtoff" or "Nuffoosk."* Neither detachment was opposed by the enemy, who attempted no serious molestation to the advance of the troops into the very heart of their mountain fastnesses. Major Billamore was met at Sungseela, eighteen or twenty miles from Deyra, by Islam Khan, the son and heir of Beebruck Khan, the head of the Boogtee tribe; this Islam Khan is now gray-headed, old-looking, careworn and feeble; he was then a young, active, handsome man. So well does trouble supply the place of years! He spoke tolerable Hindustanee, was very civil, full of expressions of friendship in his father's name and his own, and thus conducted the major and party to Deyra.

The town of Deyra is a small place, about one

hundred and fifty yards square, surrounded with a good strong mud wall, twenty feet high, with towers at the angles, and one gate in the middle of the eastern face. It is supplied with water by a small sparkling stream from the hills on the north side of the valley, distant about two miles. On this little stream, about half a mile from the town, Major Billamore's camp was pitched.

The town was full of people; there was a good bazaar apparently in it, and in and about the place there must have been some seven hundred or eight hundred armed men. At first everything was smooth and friendly; but after a few days, when the British detachment had been well scrutinized, its very small numerical strength appeared to be exciting contempt among the proud mountaineers. They soon showed their hostility in various ways, and private information was received that the main body of the Boogtee tribe, under Alim Khan (chief of the Kulpur branch of that tribe), was fast assembling at a spot in the hills near Deyra, for the purpose of attacking the British detachment. Nearly all the armed Belooche gradually left Deyra; Islam Khan still came daily to call on Major Billamore, full of professions of friendship, &c., until one day on which these professions had been more than

usually profuse, he also disappeared from Deyra. The old chief, Beebruck, was still in the town; he was very feeble, and could not, without much difficulty, ride any considerable distance on horseback.

Information then reached Major Billamore, that the whole Boogtee tribe was ready to attack the detachment, and that on the departure of old Beebruck, this attack would take place. Measures were taken to prevent the old man's departure; he made an attempt to leave the place during the night, but was stopped and detained.

Meanwhile, very similar proceedings had been going on at Kahun; at both places the apparent weakness of the British detachments tempted the treacherous Belooche to attempt their destruction.

Captain Raitt, finding his provisions likely to run short, and that from the hostile bearing of the people no more would be in all probability obtainable, under orders from Major Billamore, left a company of the grenadiers, under command of Licutenant Peacocke, strongly posted in a small mud fort, about a mile from the town of Kahun, and marched with the rest of his detachment to Deyra.

It was on the night after his arrival at that place, that the old Boogtee chief attempted to

leave it, in order to join his tribe, now up in arms against Major Billamore. The British detachment at Deyra was under arms the whole of that night, but no attack was made until after daybreak, when the videttes galloped in, reporting the enemy to be approaching in full force. The Boogtees, about twelve hundred in number, were soon seen approaching through the jungle from the eastward; their line presented a most formidable appearance to the small British detachment; they were strong, fierce-looking men, and came on with loud shouts, with much flourishing of swords and firing of matchlocks. During this advance of the enemy's line, the old chief, Beebruck, had been allowed, on some specious pretence, to go to a little distance outside the town, in charge of a file of sepoys, and an attempt, very nearly successful, was now made by the Boogtees to carry him off. A small party of horsemen contrived to approach unseen up the bed of a nullah, and suddenly made a dash at the sepoys guarding Beebruck; these, however, stood firm, and in an instant Clarke, perceiving what was going on, sprang to the spot, struck one of the Boogtees from his horse, seized another by the throat, and brought him, as well as the old chief, back prisoner. The enemy continued to advance, but the firm, silent array of the British

detachment appeared to appal them. Savage and fierce as the Belooche warriors appeared, they feared to close with their foes; not a musket-shot was fired, nor was a man hurt on our side. A tremendously noisy but distant and harmless fire of matchlocks was maintained for some time by the mountaineers, who then withdrew, with a loss of thirty-three men and some horses killed by the fire of the British artillery, in addition to others wounded.

The town of Deyra had hitherto been treated as a friendly place; it was now taken possession of, and all property found in it proclaimed to be lawful prize. The British detachment moved inside the walls, and was quartered in the houses in the town. A considerable quantity of grain and flour found in the town was handed over to the commissariat, and formed a most opportune addition to means at Major Billamore's disposal; while a great part of the force henceforth lived chiefly on mutton and beef, so that the slender stores of the detachment were made to last during the whole period it was in the hills, or for three and a-half months, without the smallest assistance or support during that time being ever received from head-quarters, or from the plain country.

The Boogtee chief, Beebruck, was sent to Shah-

poor, well guarded, and handed over to the political officers.

The enemy occupied the hills round Deyra, cut off the stream of water which supplied the place, and prevented any forage being brought in. Captain Brown proceeded with a detachment to turn the water on again, which he succeeded in doing after a slight skirmish, in which a few of the mountaineers were killed; he then remained at the spring all day, by which time a large pit close to Deyra had become filled with water, so that the shutting off the water, if repeated, could give no further annoyance for many days to come.

Next day, a party consisting of one hundred and fifty infantry under Captain Raitt, and one hundred of the Sinde irregular horse, under Lieutenant Clarke, proceeded with all the camels of the detachment to some fields, about seven miles west of Deyra, to bring in forage.

This was too tempting an opportunity for the Boogtees to lose; they accordingly assembled in great numbers in the hills at a place called Tructnee, close to the spot, and the camels had hardly been loaded with forage when the mountaineers, outnumbering the British detachment in the proportion of five to one, came down sword in hand and with loud shouts on the

sepoys. Captain Raitt, an excellent and stout-hearted officer, received them with a rapid and well sustained fire; but unchecked by the musketry, the swordsmen rushed on, and were not ten yards from the bayonets of the infantry when Clarke let loose his horsemen; in an instant the mountaineers were broken, struck down, trampled under foot, and compelled to flight; seventy-nine of them were killed, a great many more wounded, but the remainder found safe refuge in their hills, and the horsemen were recalled. The loss on the British side was trifling, three men of the infantry were killed, and nine or ten wounded, some of them severely, of the horsemen one only was slain but many were wounded, including their gallant leader Lieutenant Clarke. There were three leaders of the Boogtees, remarkable by being the only mounted men among them; these were all killed, and this severe defeat convinced the whole from that day forth that it was useless to attempt a fair fight against the British troops. Major Billamore now determined to leave part of his force at Deyra for a while, and to proceed with the remainder to Kahun, thence to return to the plain by the best route he could find.

It was considered of importance that his artillery should accompany him to Kahun in order to

show the mountain tribes that their most difficult high and rugged hills were not inaccessible to our guns; but the nature of the country was reported by the officers who had just passed through it to be so difficult as to render the transport of artillery through it a matter of *absolute impossibility;* the artillery officer was however still confident; wherefore Major Billamore allowed him to take a detachment and examine the worst part of the road himself.

He therefore proceeded from Deyra with a company of infantry under Lieutenant Stanley, of the 5th regiment, and a troop of the Sinde Irregular Horse, under Lieutenant Clarke. On entering the Murrow valley they were fired on by a small party of the Boogtees who immediately fled, but one of them was overtaken and killed by the horsemen. The plain was covered with corn fields, and in these were numerous flocks of sheep and herds of cattle. These were with much trouble secured, to the number of several thousand sheep, and about one thousand head of oxen and cows; and the artillery officer with his detachment then halted for the night at a small walled village by name Meerza-ke-Ghurree, which he found newly deserted. Lieutenant Peacocke was known to be on his march from Kahun, and

Lieutenant Jacob expected him next day when he intended to hand over to him the captured cattle to convoy to Deyra. This accordingly took place, Lieutenant Peacocke brought the cattle safely to Deyra where it proved of the greatest service to the British troops rendering them independent of all further supplies, most of the men living on flesh meat as mentioned above.

The artillery officer and his party proceeded onwards towards Kahun, and encamped at Kateychee ke Ghurree. The enemy, both Murrees and Boogtees, prowled about the camp at night, and fired into it, but finding every one on the alert, attempted nothing serious. On the next and two following days, the extemporary pioneers who had accompanied the party from Deyra were set to work on the road, and four very bad places were made passable for the artillery; the rest of the road was thought difficult, but still practicable. Beyond Kateychee ke Ghurree, towards Kahun, Captain Raitt and his officers had reported that there were no parts of the road absolutely impassable; wherefore, having removed the worst difficulties of the route, Lieutenant Jacob thought it unnecessary to proceed further, returned with his party to Deyra, and reported to Major Billamore that he was ready to proceed with his artil-

lery to Kahun, and to reach that place in two marches from Deyra, if necessary, while Captain Raitt's detachment had performed the journey in three. A few days afterwards, Major Billamore, Captain Brown, with the light company of the 5th, under Lieutenant Stanley, a company of the grenadiers, under Lieutenant Wiseman, a troop of the Sinde irregular horse, under a native officer, and the artillery under Lieutenant Jacob, marched from Deyra towards Kahun; they marched at six in the morning, and, working hard without ceasing all day, reached Kateychee ke Ghurree, distant twenty miles, at eight o'clock in the evening. Here it came on to rain heavily, and it was necessary, in consequence, to halt for two days. The weather was intensely cold; everything was covered with a thick coating of ice; the sepoys were almost frozen to death, but they bore all cheerfully. Kahun was distant about twenty-five miles; there was water only at one spot on the road, and this was about half-way to Kahun. Information was now received that the whole Murree tribe had assembled near the water, expecting the detachment to halt at that place, and intending to attack it unawares; to defeat this purpose, it was proposed to march at once straight to Kahun, and take possession of the place. This was carried into

effect. As soon as the rain ceased, and the state of the ground would admit of camels moving, Major Billamore and his detachment proceeded direct to Kahun. Some difficult hills occurred on the road, over which the artillery-carriages were transported with great labour; but starting early in the morning from Kateychee ke Ghurree, the detachment reached Kahun in safety shortly after dark, having met with no opposition, and having seen no enemy by the way. The town was found quite deserted, and was occupied next day by the British troops.

The artillery officer who had examined and sketched, as well as he could, the whole of the country passed over by the force since leaving Poolijee, now thought that a nearer route could be found back to that place than the long, very difficult, and circuitous road *via* Lahree; he had picked up a man of the Mussooree branch of the Boogtee tribe, who had long been resident as a herdsman in the Boogtee and Murree hills, and this man, in answer to inquiries, said that there did exist a path over the mountains, bounding the south side of the valley of Kahun, which he was willing and able to point out. Under his guidance the artillery officer, with some difficulty, proceeded to the top of the mountain; the path was only a

sheep walk, and seemed tremendously difficult even for a single horseman; the part over and through the mountain was about four miles in length. This was the pass of "Nuffoosk," a place whose name has since become so familiar, then first beheld by European eyes.

The rock, though hard, was found to yield to the pick-axe and crow bar: and the artilleryman thought that he could in a few days, notwithstanding the apparently awful difficulty of the task, cut a road out of the hill side, over which a gun might be dragged.

Major Billamore gladly assented; for the objects, to effect which the force had entered the hills, had been completely accomplished. Beejar Khan, with Durrya Khan, the head of the Jekranees, Toork Ali, Janee, Rahmut, with other chiefs of less note, in short the whole of the border robbers who had taken refuge in the hills, finding, from the proceedings at Kahun and Deyra, that the mountain tribes themselves were not safe in their rocky fastnesses, had gone in and surrendered to the political officers. The mountaineers had seen that they could not stand before the British troops, even in their own hills; and that these hills, even the highest of them, proved no obstacle to the transport of the British artillery. Such, then,

being the case, it was desirable to return to Poolijee and the plain country with all despatch.

The pioneers and all the camp followers were then set to work at the road over Nuffoosk, and in three days it was thought practical for the artillery. The Murrees offered no serious opposition to the work. They collected in great numbers about the neighbouring hills, and occasionally approached so near to the work people, gesticulating and flourishing swords, that they had to be attacked and driven off by the guard; but in general they contented themselves with firing long shots at the artilleryman and his party, which did no damage.

On the fourth day, the twenty-four pounder howitzer and the other carriages were dragged over the mountain. The road was found passable enough; but, from the great steepness and length of the pass, the labour was very great. However, before evening, Major Billamore and his detachment had crossed "*Nuffoosk,*" and encamped on the very spot on which Major Clibborn, in 1840, gained so signal a victory over, and with tremendous loss to, the Murree tribe; and then, appalled by the fearful heat and want of water, unfortunately followed up his victory by all the consequences which usually attend on a disastrous defeat.

Next day the detachment marched to "Surtoff," safely descended that great mountain, and thence proceeded, without further adventure, in three or four marches to Poolijee, which it reached on the 11th of February, 1840, about three and a-half months since it had marched from that place to enter the hills. Here also, shortly afterwards, arrived in perfect safety Captain Raitt and the remainder of the force. Every object had been fully accomplished without serious loss, and without a shadow of a disaster. The mountaineers had been thoroughly beaten whenever encountered.; the robbers, who had fled for shelter among them, compelled to surrender. The mountains had been penetrated in every direction, and roads made in the very heart of them. In short, nothing could have been more complete than was in every way the success of this expedition.

So little was this success understood, that unthinking persons supposed a similar feat to be easy enough for *any men* to perform, and this idea led to serious disaster. Little detachments were sent to occupy dangerous posts; little parties sent to guard immense convoys of camels: carelessness prevailed everywhere; the fierce and formidable mountaineers were despised, and this contempt met with severe punishment.

The secret of the success of Major Billamore's detachment was, that every member of the force, down to the humblest bullock-driver and camel-man, worked and felt as if he had some very dear personal object in view. To produce this feeling, appears to me to be one of the chief attributes of a good soldier. Be this as it may, it assuredly was wanting to every force which subsequently entered those hills, *inclusive* of the armies under Sir Charles Napier and Meer Ali Morad.

The beneficial effects of the first hill campaign were very great; they are still felt, for the mountaineers having once seen the British troops and artillery march all over their worst mountains, know that the same can be done again.

The proceedings of the British troops, who first entered the formidable mountains north of Cutchee, and encountered their fierce inhabitants, are but little known beyond this country. Their commanding officer hated writing, contented himself with a verbal report of the matter to his superiors, and very soon all appeared to be forgotten. In the account above given are omitted numerous adventures, many slight encounters, personal fights and single combats with the enemy, and such like, which if duly set forth in glowing terms might, without any exaggeration, have given an air of

romance to the story. As it is, the simple truth has been told in the plainest language. Such was the hill campaign of 1839—40. But, if the last hill campaign of 1845 be an exploit, worthy of any part of the praises bestowed on it by the historian of Sir Charles Napier, what should be said of the first? One major, one captain, and six subalterns, with seven hundred native soldiers totally unaided by others, did far more, and their deeds produced far more important and beneficial results, than all or anything done in those hills by the conqueror of Sinde.

With all the resources of a province at his uncontrolled disposal, with a treasury and arsenals sufficient to supply and equip a whole army, with two general officers under his command, and with them a host strong enough to have marched to and taken Herat. With Europeans in the army which he led into the hills, alone more than double the total strength of Major Billamore's force. With two horse-batteries, a troop of horse artillery and mountain train; with an army of native troops, horse and foot, altogether of tenfold the numbers employed in the first hill campaign, with a native prince at the head of another army of four thousand men, (a rabble indeed, but quite as good men as were the enemies to which they were op-

posed,) with all this mighty array of force, backed by the still more mighty name of the conqueror, who, the historian assures us, was feared as the brother of the devil! With all this, I say, that Sir Charles Napier against the *hill tribes* did NOTHING.

It was by the friendly co-operation of the Murree tribe alone, who refused at a critical moment to allow the fugitives from the plains to pass through their country, that Sir Charles Napier was able to lay hands on these fugitives, and that Beejar Khan was induced to surrender to Meer Ali Morad!

The Murrees assisted Sir C. Napier; and of the Boogtees, who were his enemies, not a man was touched. Islam Khan and all his people escaped; and with the exception of Meer Hussan Nootanee and his family, not a man of the mountain tribes fell into the hands of the conqueror. Those who surrendered to him at Trukkee were men of the plain alone—the Doombkees, Jekranees, &c., before described.

It was a great thing to have induced these men to surrender, especially Beejar Khan Dhoombkey, the most able leader in the whole country; but their removal from Cutchee only left the field open to the hill tribes, who had not been hurt in the least. The state of the Sinde frontier, after the hill campaign of 1845, was as bad as it had been

before it. The attempt was then made to check the mountain marauders, by offering a reward of twenty shillings a head for every Boogtee any where found, in hill or plain! The "Historian," by the way, appears to have omitted all notice of this heroic proceeding. Neither this, nor any other measure of Sir C. Napier, appears to have been very effectual in protecting the Sinde border; for the worst inroad of marauders into Sinde, since our arrival in the country in 1838, took place in December, 1846, where a body of some two thousand Boogtees and other hill men penetrated to within fifteen miles of Shikarpoor, and remained plundering at their pleasure for twenty-four hours, finally returning to their hills sixty or seventy miles off with all their immense booty in perfect safety. The ignorance of the historian regarding the first hill campaign is the more curious, since Sir C. Napier was well-acquainted with the proceedings on that occasion, and *sought and obtained full information regarding the hill country, the people, &c., from one of his officers who had served under Major Billamore.* Of the whole party which served in the hills with that officer, but three military officers remain alive. One of those three gives the above few pages to the world, in the hope of correcting some at least of the false

impressions which may exist in the minds of those who may not yet be aware of the fabulous nature of the History of the Conquest of Sinde, and of its sequel.

In spite of all the inflated boasting of the "Historian," Sir C. Napier never entered the Murree hills; and, had it not been that an officer contrived to persuade the Murrees to afford aid to the British, by denying a passage through their country to the fugitives from the plains of Poolijee, &c., the general must, in spite of his mighty force of seven thousand men of all arms, and in spite of his auxiliary army of four thousand "brave Bellooches," under Meer Ali Morad, have returned to Shikarpoor without even the appearance of any success. As it was, the *mountain tribes* were uninjured, though, by the co-operation of the Murrees with Sir C. Napier, the fugitives from the plain were induced to surrender, and were transported into Sinde.

The historian of the conqueror of Sinde has greatly exaggerated the number of the mountain tribes—the Murrees could muster about two thousand, and the Boogtees about fifteen hundred. The fugitives from the plains amounted to about fifteen hundred at the utmost. The Murrees were friendly; so that the total amount of *possible*

enemies was three thousand. Sir W. Napier says twenty thousand!

This last hill campaign, of which such a marvellous account has been given to the world by Sir W. Napier, considered with regard to its effect on the peace and quiet, the safety of life and property on the Sinde border, must be accounted a total and lamentable failure.

The removal of the warlike tribes from the plains of Cutchee left the field completely open to the Murrees and Boogtees; and the state of the Sinde border became actually worse than before.

The shrewd mountaineers knew well that three generals and a "King," with an army of eleven thousand men, could not be OFTEN brought against them! and that, if so little harm ensued from such a mighty effort, they had little to fear from the ordinary proceedings of the "conqueror." The troops at Shikarpoor even were, after all, still in continual alarm of being attacked. The hill campaign, then, having failed, the conqueror next attempted to protect his frontier by proclaiming throughout the country, that a reward of twenty shillings a head would be paid for all Boogtees brought to the British officers. Their cattle was to be seized, and the Boogtees themselves were to be treated as enemies wherever found! This,

to ordinary understandings, appears more like attempting to encourage murder and robbery in the country than to restore peace and order. But great geniuses must not be judged by common rules.

Such was the hill campaign of Sir C. Napier, and such were its effects.

In 1847, the stupid Indian officers (*who know not yet even how to load a camel*) were allowed to try *their* hands at the frontier affairs, and in their humdrum way (so different from the efforts of the genius displayed by the conqueror) they contrived not only to quiet the whole country and to restore perfect peace and safety, but, without making any fuss about the matter, to give the Boogtees, on the 1st of October, 1847, such a thrashing, that they have been sickened of plundering, and have been our most obedient servants ever since.

No more heavy blows were required; but under the common sense system now acted on, the Sinde "Border side" is as safe as the cantonment of Poona. The country is becoming fully peopled; and corn-fields are fast covering that which was a desert waste.

NOTE.

The readers of this memoir are requested to refer to Arrowsmith's Map of Cutchee.

APPENDIX.

Field Orders by Major Billamore, commanding, &c.

Poolijee, 11th February, 1840,

As the field force, under Major Billamore, is about to be broken up, the commanding officer has much pleasure in testifying to the general good conduct, and steady behaviour of the troops composing it.

For upwards of three months they have been subjected to many hardships and privations, which have been encountered and overcome, not only without a murmur, but with a cheerful alacrity which reflects the highest credit on them.

To the officers and men composing the force, the commanding officer offers his thanks for their willing and cordial co-operation, in effecting the objects for which they were ordered to take the field.

To Lieutenant Jacob, commanding the artillery,

the thanks of the commanding officer are especially due, for the very able and efficient manner in which he conducted his battery, over an unknown and difficult country, offering obstacles of no ordinary nature.

Major Billamore will have much pleasure, in bringing to the notice of the brigadier commanding in Upper Sinde, the uniform good conduct of the troops employed under him.

By order,

(Signed) L. Brown,

Captain 5th regiment N. I., Staff Officer.

Brigade Orders by Brigadier Gordon, commanding in Upper Sinde.

Sukkur, 3rd February, 1840.

Brigadier Gordon, in turning over the command of the troops in Upper Sinde to Brigadier Stevenson, cannot take leave of them, without expressing his warmest feelings for their general good conduct, and the cheerfulness with which they have performed their duty, under, perhaps, (at the season their exertions were called for) one of the most trying climates in the world. To the commanding officers his thanks are justly due.

To the field force, under Major Billamore, and

to his judicious and zealous operations, the present tranquillity of those hitherto barbarous tracts may be mainly attributed,* and the active exertions of Lieutenant Jacob now commanding the artillery, under Major Billamore, have repeatedly come to the notice of the brigadier, and afforded him the highest satisfaction.

By order,

(Signed) T. Clibborn, Captain.
Major of Brigade.

(No. 2556 of 1842.)

From the Political Agent in S. and B. to Lieutenant Jacob, commanding Sinde irregular horse.†

Sukkur, 9th November, 1842.

I cannot depart from Sinde without performing my duty to yourself and the corps you command, in acknowledging the great obligations I am under to you, to Lieutenants Malcolm and Fitzgerald, and to the native officers and men of the Sinde Irregular Ressala.

* This shows the immediate effect of the first hill campaign.

† This letter, published to the Sinde irregular horse, by order of the Political Agent, shows the state of the Sinde frontier during the year 1842, up to the arrival of Sir C. Napier in the country.

For the first time within the memory of man, Cutchee and Upper Sinde have been for a whole year, entirely free from the irruptions of the hill tribes, by which villages were annually destroyed, lives and property sacrificed, and the whole country kept in a state of fever.

During the past year the emissaries of our enemies had been unremitting in their exertions to instigate the northern hill tribes to resume their marauding habits, with a view to disturb our communication with Affghanistan through Sinde and Cutchee, and so far succeeded, that large bands of freebooters were at one time assembled for the purpose, under some of the most noted of their former leaders, but in vain they strove to effect their objects, which were solely counteracted by the indomitable zeal with which you, your officers and men so constantly exposed yourselves, especially, throughout the hot months, whereby every attempt of the marauders to enter the plains was baffled; the extaordinary vigilance you have exerted, and strict discipline you have maintained, not merely in the Sinde Ressala, but also among the quotas of Belooche horse, which were under your orders, has deterred the northern tribes from committing themselves in hostility during the late exciting period, in dread of the corps you so ably commanded.

I am bound accordingly to attribute to the Sinde irregular horse the profound tranquillity which has been preserved in upper Sinde and Cutchee; and I beg you will accept yourself, and convey to your officers and men my grateful thanks.

I have the honour to annex an extract, paragraph 11, from despatch I addressed to Mr. Secretary Maddock, the 9th ultimo, expressing my obligation to you personally.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
(Signed) J. OUTRAM,
Political Agent in S. and B.

Political Agent S. and B.,
Sukkur, Nov. 9, 1842.

Manifesto by his Excellency Major General Sir C. J. NAPIER, G.C.B., *Governor of Sinde.**

Sukkur, 13th January, 1845.

Being about to cross the Sinde frontier at the head of a strong body of troops, I think it right to state to the neighbouring tribes why I thus invade the territory of our friend, the Khan of Kelat, in

* This manifesto clearly shows the state of the Sinde frontier after two years of Sir C. Napier's administration.

order that these tribes may be satisfied as to the cause of my movements, and that they may not think the said movements arise from the desire of acquiring territory or molesting allies.

His Highness, the Khan of Kelat, has given us permission to enter his territories; and had he not done so, I must still have invaded them for the protection of our own subjects.

These territories are occupied, as regards our immediate frontier, by three powerful and predatory tribes, the Doombkees, Jekranees, and the Bhooghtees (there are also others of inferior note). These tribes are in open rebellion against their sovereign, the Khan of Kelat. During the whole of last summer they were excited by the hopes of pillage, to make, without the slightest pretext, frequent predatory inroads on the Sinde territory, plundering villages, murdering many of the inhabitants, and devastating the country. In several instances they were engaged with our outposts; and on one occasion falling on two hundred unarmed and unopposing grass cutters, they massacred nearly the whole of them, together with an officer's party of cavalry who were guarding these poor people, and whom the robbers surprised. Many villages on our frontier were left desolate; the inhabitants of which, abandoning their crops, fled

further into the interior of Sinde, calling aloud upon me, as governor of the province, to give them protection. On my part, I applied to their sovereign, the Khan of Kelat, to control his subjects. He promised to do this; but they were not controlled.

I believe his Highness, the Khan, has the most friendly intentions with regard to the British government; but it was evident that the arch-robber and rebel, Beejar Khan Doomkee, was too powerful in arms to be reduced to obedience by his prince. So true is this, that he openly bestowed in Jaghire large tracts of his sovereign's territory, and to which the latter was constrained to submit. I was, therefore, obliged to reinforce our out-posts against this unexpected and unprovoked enemy; and on one occasion our troops wholly failed in an attack made upon Beejar Khan. This was at the period of the year when the heat was so very great as to be insupportable to human beings, exposed to mid-day sun.

My orders to the frontier posts were then issued to remain on the defensive during the hot weather. These orders, together with the success of Beejar Khan, rendered the robber tribes more daring. They frequently entered the Sindian frontier in search of plunder, and were on two or three occa-

sions attacked in our own territory, and defeated by the troops, the police, and the villagers themselves, who several times turned out to aid the troops.

It must be evident to every one, that such a state of things could not be suffered by any regular government; and I was directed by the Governor General of India to take such steps as were necessary to tranquillise the frontier and protect the people of Sinde.

I have here to remark, that the Ex-ameer Shere Mahomed had located himself among these robbers, and excited them to plunder Sinde. He was also in hopes of exciting an insurrection in his favour. But the chiefs of Sinde had no desire for his return; still less would the people of Sinde assist him, conscious of having a degree of protection under the British government which they never experienced under that of the Ameers. The Ameer consequently gave over his attempts, and retired to the Sikh territory.

Such was the state of things on the frontier when the cold season arrived; and, in consequence of the solicitations made by me to the Khan of Kelat, his Highness made a feeble effort against his rebel subjects: he advanced from Dadur to Poolijee.

It is evident the rebels well knew the danger they would incur were they to meet their prince on the plain, when he would be assisted at any moment by the British, and each day's march brought him nearer to our out posts.

The strength of the rebels lay in the Bhoogtee mountains; and to the mountains they of course retired. Among these celebrated defiles and passes, the Khan dared not pursue them. The amount of his forces did not exceed two thousand men, and these were by no means under his command: an immediate retreat was decided upon by his Highness.

While this prince was at Poolijee, I sent a vakeel to beg that he would allow me to have a conference with him, either at Poolijee, at Dadur, at Bagh, at Gundava, or any other place his Highness chose to appoint. His answer was a refusal, for reasons which I cannot make public, without doing his Highness an injury.

My vakeel therefore returned; but I felt that it was necessary to have in writing his Highness's formal acknowledgement of his inability to control his subjects, the Doombkies, Jekranees, and Bhoogtees, and his desire that I would punish their rebellion and their murderous inroads upon the Sindè territory.

It was also necessary that I should have his Highness's reasons in writing for not meeting me. I therefore despatched Mr. Brown, the secretary to the Sinde government, who is a personal friend of the Khan's, and possessing my highest confidence, in hopes some arrangements might be made for a united exertion to repress these mountain tribes, but in vain. The state of the Khan's territory, beyond the Bolan pass, rendered him unable to attend to the affairs of Cutchee; and he appeared to hold nothing but a nominal sovereignty over that rich tract of country, of which Bagh is the centre.

On Mr. Brown's return from Bagh, so daring were the robber tribes, that he was nearly taken (and to be taken by them is synonymous with being murdered), by three hundred cavalry belonging to the rebels, who had pushed about eighty miles from their haunts for the express purpose of way-laying Mr. Brown. The course to be pursued by me has now become clear and decisive. It is to enter the Bhoogtee mountains, and attack these robber tribes in their fastnesses. They are the Pindaries of the Indus.

As Mr. Brown rode through the villages, he found them miserable. I will use the words of his report to me.

The route I pursued through Cutchee was by Kunda, Kassim Ke Ghote, and Bagh, which line I remember in former days to be richly cultivated. It is now a desert. I did not meet with an acre of cultivation in Cutchee: the condition of the people is most miserable. They have no security for their property—villages are daily plundered by the hill robbers. I heard many villagers (some of whom were wounded) declare, that if they were not protected, they would fly the country and come to Sinde. It is certainly not my duty to protect these poor people, the inhabitants of Cutchee; but it is my duty to protect the inhabitants of Sinde; and therefore I shall march, on the 16th of January, beyond the frontier, at the head of a strong force, accompanied by the Sindian chiefs, Wullee Mahomed, Chandiah, Ahmed Khan Mugsee, and many others, at the head of many thousands of their followers,* all determined to revenge their plundered villages upon the mountain tribes. I shall also be assisted by his Highness, Ali Morad, Talpoor, who will march against the enemy, by whom his frontier has also been molested.

It is no small satisfaction to me that I find the Sindian chiefs, who but two years ago stood opposed

* The whole of these thousands amounted to about six hundred.

to us in battle at Meanee, now eager to draw the sword and fight under British colours. It gives no equivocal proof of their contentment with the government of Sinde.

What the result of these operations may be, it is impossible to say; but I hope it will be such as permanently to secure the tranquillity of the Sindian frontier, and enable our ally, the Khan of Kelat, to recover the rule of his country from these robbers. With this last I have nothing to do. The moment I have punished the robbers I shall retire within our own frontier,* satisfied that I have performed my duty to the East India Company, to the people of Sinde, and to humanity.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER, Maj. Gen.,
Governor of Sinde.

General Orders, by his Excellency Major General Sir C. NAPIER, G.C.B., *Governor of Sinde.*†

Head Quarters, Camp Shahpoor,
19*th January*, 1845.

No. 1. There are two circumstances which occurred in the opening of this campaign against the

* Sir C. Napier did not withdraw his troops within the Sinde frontier, a strong detachment was posted at Shahpoor, thirty miles beyond the British frontier, and retained there for more than three years.

† The breadth of the desert between Sinde and Cut-

robber tribes, which excites the admiration of the Major-general and Governor, and which he thinks it right to make the subject of a separate order. The first is, that, in the prompt and dangerous attack for cavalry of a village like Shahpoor, in the highest degree defensible, and built for defence and which was defended, that Captain Jacob and his men carried it with the rapidity of lightning, and while losing men did not injure one of the defenders, but captured them all. This is a very rare and very glorious instance of perfect discipline as well as courage on the part of the Sinde horse; and though to men less acquainted with war it may appear trifling, yet, in the mind of the Major-general and Governor, it stamps both the Sinde horse and its commandant as first-rate soldiers—prompt, resolute, obedient, and humane, even in the momentary excitement of action against the most furious of enemies.

chee is, from Khanghur to Manootee, twenty-one miles; from Mojaim to Shahpoor, where the Sinde irregular horse marched on the occasion referred to in this order, is thirty-seven miles; from Khanghur to Ooch, where Sir C. Napier marched on commencing the hill campaign is twenty-eight miles; this last named distance Sir C. Napier in his despatch calls forty miles, Sir W. Napier doubles this, and says that the desert is eighty miles wide.

The Major-general Governor feels the greatest satisfaction in thus publicly mentioning Captain Jacob and his corps, for thus setting an example so honourable to themselves and to the army.

This order to be translated, and to be read to every regiment, European and native, serving in Sinde.

By Order,

(Signed) E. GREEN, Major,

Assistant Adjutant-general.

Extract from General Orders by his Excellency Major-general Sir C. NAPIER, G.C.B., *and Governor of Sinde.*

Head quarters, Truckee,

11*th March,* 1845.

Twenty-five brave robbers, on foot, well armed with swords, shields, and matchlocks, met twenty of the Sinde horse patroling in the desert. The robbers gave a volley and charged. The Sinde horse met them; a combat with sabres ensued. The Sinde horse had one man killed and two wounded; four horses killed and two wounded. Of the enemy, every man fell, sword in hand. Quarter was repeatedly offered to these stern gladiators, but they refused: and every robber bit

the dust. Honour be to their courage—more honour to their conquerors. Another laurel leaf has been added to the rich wreath of Jacob's horse. The conduct of Jemadar Guffoor Mahomed and his companions demands the governor's highest approbation; and he will report their gallantry to the Governor-general of India, and to the Commander-in-chief of the Bombay army, as soon as Captain Jacob sends in the names of these brave men.*

(Signed) C. J. Napier, G.C.B.,
Governor of Sinde.

(True Extract),
(Signed) E. Green, Major,
Assistant Adjutant-general.

No. 1201 of 1846.

From Captain Goldney, Collector and Magistrate, Shikarpoor.

Sir—I beg to report for your information, that, in obedience to his Excellency's instructions, I have issued notices that a reward of ten rupees

* Sir W. Napier calls the detachment of the Sinde irregular horse mentioned in this order "Moguls," he might as well style the men of Kent (the men of the Sinde irregular horse are Hindustanee) "Jutts."

will be paid for every Boogtee prisoner delivered to your frontier posts.

May I request that you will intimate the same to the officers commanding the out-posts, both native and European, lest any untoward circumstances should occur in the receipt of the prisoners, or the payments, or certificate for payment, of the stipulated reward to damp the zeal of our borderers.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) P. GOLDNEY,*

Collector and Magistsate.

Shikarpoor,
8th August, 1846.

Directions of his Excellency the Governor of Sinde, regarding the treatment of the Boogtees after the Hill campaign.†

Dated 8th January, 1846.

SIR—By direction of his Excellency the Governor, I have the honour to inform you that the Boogtees are outlaws; and all cattle belonging to

* This letter with proclamation in English and Persian was published all over the border country by order of Sir C. Napier.

† This order was also published throughout Upper Sinde, and was never countermanded.

them and themselves are to be captured or killed when they come near the frontier.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
(Signed) E. J. Brown,
Secretary to the Government of Sinde.

Kurrachee,
8th January, 1846.

Notification. Political Department.

Bombay Castle, Oct. 27th, 1847.

The Honourable the Governor in Council is pleased to direct that the following despatch from Colonel the Honourable H. Dundas, commanding the troops in Sinde, to the Adjutant-general of the army, with the accompanying reports from Major Jacob and Lieutenant Merewether of the Sinde Irregular Horse, be published for general information.

The skilful arrangements and judicious precautions of Major Jacob, and the admirable conduct and daring spirit of Lieutenant Merewether, and the party of the Sinde horse under his command, have combined to achieve a signal and most important service. By the destruction of this large body of marauders assembled on the frontier, the peace of the British territories has, it may be hoped,

been effectually secured, and the Governor in Council feels that the highest praise is due to all who have borne any part in this gallant and successful exploit. The Sinde horse on this occasion has added another to the many recorded instances of valour and devotion to its duty, which have always been conspicuous in the short but brilliant career of this distinguished corps.

By order of the Honourable the Governor in Council.

A. Malet.
Chief Sec. to Government.

To the Adjutant General of the Army, Poona.

Sir,—It is with the greatest satisfaction I have the honour to transmit for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the enclosed copies of despatches received through Lieutenant-colonel Shaw, commanding in Upper Sinde from Major Jacob commanding the Sinde Irregular horse and the frontier, and from Lieutenant Merewether second in command of the 1st regiment, and commanding detachment at Shahpoor, detailing a most complete and decisive success, gained by Lieutenant Merewether and one hundred and thirty-two men of all ranks of the 1st regiment

Sinde horse, over the combined Boogtee tribe of Beloochees on the 1st instant.

These reports are so complete in themselves that it only remains for me to submit them for the perusal of his Excellency, adding however the meed of praise due to Major Jacob and Lieutenant Merewether.

To the former officer for the excellence of the arrangements which have been made by him, since the frontier has been placed under his charge by His Excellency Sir Charles Napier, G.C.B., who having the highest confidence in Major Jacob's skill and ability, (always conspicuous) that officer has now shown how fully it was deserved. To these arrangements may be attributed the most signal success that has ever attended the careful watching of this long-vexed frontier, which has ended in the total destruction of the most notorious freebooters in Cutchee.

Major Jacob's activity, skill, and judgment, have been long known to his military superiors, and I am most happy in being the means of reporting the success which has at last attended his unremitting vigilance, and untiring exertions.

To the conduct of Lieutenant Merewether, I would also most particularly call the attention of His Excellency the Commander-in-chief. This

officer though young in years and service, has been most actively employed in the field almost throughout that period of service, and always with credit to himself. He wears a medal for the battle of Hyderabad, and since he has been with the Sinde horse formed under the eye of Major Jacob, has now proved himself a first rate cavalry officer.

His conduct on the present occasion speaks for itself, in his well and modestly worded despatch. Watching for months in the desert, an enemy artful and daring as these Boogtee robbers have shown themselves, he has bided his time, and when that time came, has swept them from the face of the earth.

He appears to have manœuvered his squadron with great skill and judgment, and the fearful loss of life on the part of the robbers will prove to His Excellency with what gallantry and determination the charges were made and executed.

While mentioning the conduct of the European officers, I must not fail to speak of the squadron which Lieutenant Merewether commanded and led. Officers and men of the Sinde horse appear to be of one heart and mind, and the devotion to the service, and gallantry of the native officer, non-commissioned officers and troopers, which formed Lieutenant Merewether's small force, is

beyond all praise. I have therefore thought it right to send the whole of their names to His Excellency for such notice as he may think their gallant conduct deserves.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) H. DUNDAS, Colonel.

Head Quarters, *Commanding the troops in Sinde.*
Kurrachee, 7th October, 1847.

To Lieutenant-colonel M. SHAW, *Commanding in Upper Sinde.*

SIR,—I have the honour herewith to forward a report from Lieutenant Merewether, commanding at Shahpoor, of proceedings with regard to the inroad of the Boogtee tribe, reported by me to you yesterday. Lieutenant Merewether's letter requires no comment,—it sets forth distinctly and fully the particulars of the most perfectly successful affair of the kind I have ever witnessed or heard of. One hundred and thirty-three men killed, nearly six hundred enemies, and made prisoners one hundred and twenty, in two hours fighting. The enemy resisting manfully the whole time, and obstinately refusing quarter. Five hundred and sixty dead bodies have been counted, and there are probably more lying about in the jungle.

The conduct of Lieutenant Merewether himself has been beyond praise, and shows a rare and most excellent unison of implicit obedience and great military skill, of cool and careful prudence with the most daring courage.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) J. Jacob, Major.

Commanding Sinde Irregular Horse, Frontier.

Shapoor, 2nd October, 1847.

To Major Jacob, *commanding frontier, Khanghur.*

Sir,—Having received the good intelligence of the whole Boogtee force having entered the plain as already reported to you, I have the honour to inform you that I started at half-past one o'clock on the morning of the 1st October, with a party of the Sinde irregular horse, amounting to one hundred and thirty-three men of all ranks, from Shapoor, in pursuit of the enemy. I arrived at the Zeemanee river just as it became light enough to see clearly the tracks of the enemy. I observed a spot in the bed of the Zeemanee river, where they had apparently halted for a short time; from the marks I was of opinion that their strength might be six or seven hundred footmen with a small party of horse. I thence proceeded, according to

your instructions, along the foot of the small hills, intending to take post in the Téywagh, thinking that the enemy would certainly return that way, and the ground being favourable for cavalry to act on. However, I had not proceeded a quarter of a mile beyond the Zeemanee river, when Jan Mahomed Kyheeree, who was a short distance in advance, came back and informed me that he heard loud shouting, and much noise in the direction of Koonree. My detachment was marching in column of troops, I wheeled them into line and proceeded in the direction of Koonree, when near the jungle about that place, I saw the enemy formed in a deep and long line to my left. They appeared to be making a side movement towards the jungle. I therefore, passed rapidly along their front to cut them off from the jungle, and drive them to the open plain. They were at this time posted in some rough broken ground with sand hillocks and bushes, but apparently fancying from my galloping along their front that I did not intend to attack them, they left their vantage ground and rushed forward to attack me with much firing, loud shouts and howls. This at once gave me all I wished for, namely, a fair field; I immediately changed, front to the left, which the men did most steadily, as if on parade. When my change of position was exe-

cuted, I charged. The charge was made steadily, and rapidly with irresistible effect The Boogtees had formed a solid mass to receive us, but were overthrown at the first onset with terrible loss. They then moved off towards the hills, distant about three miles, in disorder, but shouldering together as closely as they could. We continued our attacks, killing numbers, until on recrossing the Zemanee river they made another short stand. They were again overthrown and driven into the open plain. They were now approaching the low hills when, Russaidar Shaik Ali, very judiciously getting some men in advance, cut them off from that place of refuge, and they turned back towards Koonree. Their numbers were now getting small, but though repeated offers of quarter were made to them, they obstinately continued to fight until the destruction was so great that their numbers were reduced to about one hundred and twenty, many of whom were wounded. At last, seeing resistance utterly hopeless, they were induced to throw down their arms and surrender; not a single footman escaped capture or death, two horsemen alone out of the whole force of the encmy, stated by the prisoners to have been full seven hundred in all, including twenty-five horsemen; among the slain are several chieftains of note, in fact, all the

leaders of repute in the tribe. The undermentioned were recognised among the dead :—

Hundoo . . . . . Nothanee.
Kora . . . . . Kulpur.
Kurreemdad . . . Raimoozye.
Jumah . . (outlaw) Jakranee.
Chuttah . . (ditto) Ditto.
(Killed in the attack on Kundranee.)
Kumber . . . . Nephew of the Shumbrane chief, "Lango."
Also a nephew of Hundoo's name unknown.
Sunjur . . . . . Kind.

There were also many others, esteemed as warlike characters but of less note, killed.—Neither Islam Khan nor Alim Khan were with the party.

Our own loss has, I am happy to say, been trifling, compared to the result as shown by the annexed return of killed and wounded, nine of our horses were killed and ten wounded, seven of them mortally so: amongst the wounded is your own horse, which I was riding at the time. He has received two severe sword cuts, one on the loins close behind the saddle, and the other on the heel. After all was over I returned to Shahpoor, *via* Chuttur, to which latter place I had sent all

the prisoners able to march, under the custody of Naib Russuldar Azeem Khan. Russaidar Shaik Alli, with the remainder of my detachment, I left at Koonree to take care of the wounded till I could send out assistance and carriage from this place. All returned to Shahpoor this morning.

Before I fell in with the enemy they had attempted to plunder the village of Kundranee, whence they were beaten off by the head man, Deen Mahomed Kyberee, in splendid style. Deen Mahomed and his people killing the notorious "Chuttah" Jakranee and others, and taking one prisoner. Three determined attacks were made by the Boogtees on the fort, and at one time the assailants had actually reached the top of the wall, but were thrown back by the defenders.

All my native officers and men behaved well in this affair, nothing could be more perfect than the steadiness, resolution and quickness which they showed throughout, but I beg particularly to bring to your notice the excellent conduct of,

Russaidar Shaik Alli.
Naib Russaldar Azeem Khan.
Sowar Sulleen Khan.
„ Bujjoo Khan.
„ Bahadoor Khan.
„ Kurreem Khan.

I saw these four sowars each kill several of the enemy in fair stand up fight hand to hand, but nearly all must have done equally well, although it be not possible for me to specify every man's deeds individually. I beg leave also to remark that the destructive effect of our little carbines, used in one hand, at close quarters, was quite terrible to behold. Every shot appeared to kill or disable an enemy, who were often, by reason of the bushes and broken ground, enabled just to keep out of sword's reach.

I must not omit to mention that Jan Mahomed Kyheeree, with four of his followers, was close to me during nearly the whole of the action, and behaved exceedingly well. Jan Mahomed fought stoutly, killing several of the enemy before his sword broke over the head of another.

I have made the best provision I can for the wounded prisoners who are being carefully attended to by assistant-surgeon, J. Pirie.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) W. Merewether, Lieut.

2nd Command S. I. H. Commanding

Out Posts, Shahpoor.

Shahpoor, 2nd October, 1847.

General Orders by the Commander-in-Chief.

Head Quarters, Poona, 30th Oct., 1847.

1. Lieutenant Merewether, second in command of the first Sinde Irregular Horse, has, with one hundred and thirty-two men of that corps, executed a brilliant exploit. He routed and totally defeated a body of seven hundred freebooters belonging to the Boogtee tribe of Beloochees on the 1st instant: who, notwithstanding quarter was repeatedly offered to them, obstinately refused the boon, and provoked their own destruction.

The coolness and military science this officer exemplified in taking up his position, the promptness with which he wheeled his men into line, and the gallantry with which he instantly attacked his numerous enemy, merit the Commander-in-Chief's warm approbation, which he thus publicly offers to Lieutenant Merewether and the men of the Sinde horse who participated with him on this occasion.

The Sinde horse, on every service on which they have been employed, have conducted themselves in the most gallant manner; and to Captain Jacob, who commands, and has brought them to this state of perfection, the Commander-in-Chief offers his meed of praise and approbation, and begs that officer will accept the high opinion his Excellency entertains of his distinguished merit.

(Signed) H. Hancock, Lieut.-Colonel.
Acting Adjutant-General of the army.

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